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According to the U.S. General Accounting Office, the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB)
is the largest  state trading enterprise reporting to the World Trade  Organization
under Article XVII requirements. This study estimates the market power exerted by
the CWB in international  barley markets. The analysis incorporates international
price discrimination across  markets  for similar types of barley, the  intertwining
relationships between feed and malting barley markets, and producer behavior in the
absence of the CWB. The CWB was able to capture an annual average of $72 million
in additional revenue beyond the amount that would have been generated by purely
competitive multiple sellers of Canadian barley during the period  1985-94.
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Introduction
The marketing practices of state trading enterprises (STEs) have become one of the most
prevalent international trade issues since the completion of the Uruguay Round of  trade
negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that culminated
in establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. The U.S. General
Accounting Office (GAO) recently released at least three major reports related to state
trading (U.S. GAO 1995,  1996, 1998).  In its 1996 report, the GAO focused on the mar-
keting practices of the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB), the Australian Wheat Board, and
the New Zealand Dairy Board as three of the most important state trading enterprises
affiliated  with WTO  member  countries.  Of all countries that report state trading
activities to the GATT/WTO under Article XVII requirements, the CWB is the largest
both in terms of volume and annual sales. The United States has argued that STEs such
as the CWB significantly distort trade and that their actions should be disciplined as a
part of the next round of WTO negotiations.
The CWB, as the sole exporter of wheat and barley from western Canada, has often
been cast as a villain in recent trade disputes. Some analysts believe that the CWB has
an unfair advantage in international grain markets  because its single-desk exporter
status is used to exercise market power, thereby unfairly increasing the returns to
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Canadian wheat and barley producers at the expense of U.S. and other global compet-
itors. Some argue that the CWB purposefully dumps grain into the U.S. market below
cost. Yet others contend the CWB  is not successful at increasing producer revenue
because the increase in returns due to CWB market power, if indeed  such additional
returns even exist, are outweighed by the excess administrative,  handling,  and other
costs accrued by the CWB.
Both national and international  debates involving the CWB prompted an unprece-
dented series of events in the 1990s, triggered by analyses undertaken by a multifaceted
group of players involved in all sides of this complex issue. A continental barley market,
which involved liberating U.S. markets for Canadian feed barley exporters, was estab-
lished in August 1993. This continental barley market was repealed afterjust six weeks
of operation because it was found to violate various Canadian internal laws. The impli-
cations of the continental barley markets were investigated extensively in various studies
(e.g., CWB; Gray, Ulrich, and Schmitz; Schmitz, Gray, and Ulrich; Carter 1993a,b, 1994;
Brooks; Veeman; and Schmeiser).
In 1994, a "voluntary" export restraint was placed on Canadian durum exports to the
U.S. (Duncan and Koo).  This restraint was lifted after one year. A Western  Grain
Marketing Panel was established to study possible future directions for the CWB, and
a Canada-U.S. Joint Commission on Grains was formed to recommend changes to U.S.-
Canadian grain trade practices. In 1996, a federal lawsuit was filed in Canada (Archibald
et al. vs. the CWB and Her Majesty the Queen) for the purpose of removing the statutory
authority of the CWB to control grain exports; however, the Canadian courts ruled in
favor of the CWB (see Schmitz  1996a,b, and Carter and Loyns).
In February  1997, a plebiscite  of barley producers was held in western Canada.
Canadian barley producers voted to retain the single-desk status of the CWB. A "Record
of Understanding"  between Canada and the U.S. was signed in December  1998 (U.S.
Trade Representative's  Office), which eventually led to the establishment in April 1999
of a Consultative Committee on Agriculture to improve cooperation on agricultural trade
issues (U.S. Department of Agriculture,  Foreign Agricultural Service).
While portions of this debate will never be resolved through empirical  explication,
the answers to at least three major questions, posed below, can be analyzed within
an economic framework:
1.  Has the CWB been able to achieve price discrimination across different internation-
al markets, and how do export subsidies in other countries, such as the U.S. Export
Enhancement Program (EEP), affect the ability of the CWB to price discriminate?
2.  Are the administrative,  handling, and other costs of marketing grain in Canada
higher or lower than those incurred  by large grain marketing organizations  in
other countries, such as Cargill? If higher, what portion of this inefficiency can be
attributed to the CWB, and how much can be attributed to inefficiencies in other
aspects of the Canadian marketing system that are not directly controlled by the
CWB?
3.  If there is significant evidence that the CWB has been able to price discriminate
among importers, does this imply that the CWB has been able to achieve market
power in international markets?  If so, what is the magnitude  of the benefits
accruing to Canadian producers as a direct result of this market power?
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The first question has been explored by Brooks and Schmitz;  Kraft, Furtan, and
Tyrchniewicz;  Clark; Goodwin and Smith; and Carter (1993a,b).  Brooks and Schmitz
found evidence of price discrimination by the CWB across international  feed barley
markets, regardless of whether the United States provided EEP subsidies or not. Kraft,
Furtan,  and Tyrchniewicz  found evidence  of price discrimination by the CWB  across
international  wheat markets. Both of these studies had access to CWB  contract data
regarding sales of Canadian grain by destination. Carter did not find evidence of price
discrimination across barley markets. Using a Granger causality test, Clark did not find
evidence  the CWB  influenced international  barley prices.  Goodwin and Smith found
that the CWB "Granger-causes" international wheat prices to move downward, implying
the CWB behaves as a price leader in international  wheat markets. The latter three
studies did not have access to data concerning prices received by the CWB from different
destination markets.
The second question has been investigated by Carter, Loyns, and Berwald; Schmitz,
Furtan, Brooks, and Gray; Schmitz,  Gray, Schmitz,  and Storey; Carter and Loyns;
Schmitz (1996a,b); and Furtan, Kraft, and Tyrchniewicz. However, a detailed analysis
of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper.1
The third question has been partially addressed by Carter and Loyns (1993a,b);
Schmitz,  Gray, and Ulrich; and Gray, Ulrich,  and Schmitz.  These articles present
opposite sides of the debate regarding the continental barley market which was briefly
introduced  in 1993.  Schmitz, Gray,  and Ulrich provide  evidence  of market power
exercised by the CWB in both the international feed and malting barley markets. Carter
and Loyns  argue that the CWB  exerts no market power in international  feed barley
markets, but they also concede that the CWB exercises at least some market power in
international  malting barley markets.  The analyses of the continental  barley market
presented in these studies are incomplete in that they examine the restricted possibility
of allowing direct exports by Canadian producers to the U.S. market only. They do not
explore  the less restrictive  case  of complete export liberalization to all international
markets,  nor do they attempt to capture the intertwining relationships  between feed
and malting barley markets.
In this study, we seek to answer the third question by constructing a synthetic model
that estimates the import demand parameters  for Canadian feed, two-rowed, and six-
rowed malting barley by country of destination. These parameters are estimated as an
entire system using a set of equations to capture the interaction between feed and
malting barley markets at the margin, under the assumption that the CWB exerts some
market power in international barley markets.  Once these demand parameters  have
been estimated,  a counterfactual model is constructed to simulate the revenue that
would accrue to Canadian barley producers if the statutory marketing powers of the
CWB were removed. This latter model assumes a system of purely competitive multiple
sellers  of Canadian feed and malting barley  would  arise if  the statutory marketing
authority of the CWB had not been granted. The actual revenue realized by Canadian
feed and malting barley producers from 1985-94 is compared to the revenue that would
have accrued to producers if the CWB had not exercised control over feed and malting
barley exports during that same period.
1 For a more detailed survey of the issues surrounding the CWB and a more detailed comparison  of the results of past
investigations that attempted to answer questions 1 and 2, see Brooks and Schmitz.
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The CWB and
International Feed and Barley Markets
The CWB is the single-desk seller of western Canadian wheat, feed barley, and malting
barley for export destinations. In the domestic market, the CWB  is the sole  seller of
western Canadian wheat and barley for human consumption, but operates alongside an
open cash market for feed barley and feed wheat in western Canada. In addition, it must
compete with imports of food and feed grain into the domestic market. The CWB is a
form of collective action by western Canadian grain producers that attempts to maximize
returns by jointly providing marketing services and countervailing power against large
multinational grain trading companies. The existence  of the CWB is a direct result of
public policy through the Canadian Wheat Board Act. The CWB operates as a marketing
agency for producers and has adopted as its objective the maximization of returns from
sales of wheat and barley. The CWB acts as the producers' agent through which all sales
and payments are made.
The CWB is a major player in world feed and malting barley markets. Canada and
Australia together have more than a 50% market share of world barley exports. For
malting barley, Canada's export market share reached as high as 44% in 1994/95. The
Canadian domestic market for feed barley comprises the largest portion of  total Canadian
barley sales in most years.
Sales of feed barley by Canadian producers directly into the domestic market are not
controlled by the CWB. These direct sales generally represent over 50% oftotal Canadian
barley production within a typical year. The CWB is not allowed to sell feed barley into
the domestic market and it does not directly control the level of domestic production.
Any surplus over cost earned from sales by the CWB is returned to producers. Producers
receive these payments in the form of an initial payment upon delivery, possible interim
payments if deemed necessary, and a final payment which is received sometime after
the end of each pooling period. For these reasons, with respect to Canadian barley, the
CWB cannot be viewed as a pure monopolist, a middleman, or a monopsonist. However,
the CWB does have power to sell Canadian barley into different markets at different
prices in order to maximize the return to pool, subject to the aforementioned constraints.
The CWB cannot directly control the quantity of feed barley it receives from Canadian
producers because producers have the option of selling feed barley directly into the
domestic market. Canadian producers must make their sales decisions by comparing the
current market price with the current expected pool return for feed barley as estimated
by the CWB. Because the CWB does not enter into domestic feed barley markets, maxi-
mizing the return to pool can either increase  or reduce the total revenue  accruing to
Canadian barley producers. The exact impact of the CWB on Canadian barley producers
depends upon many factors, including the shape of the domestic supply curve, the
domestic demand curve, and the foreign excess demand curves for Canadian feed and
malting barley in different countries.
Canadian barley producers plant both malting varieties and feed varieties. Not all
malting varieties planted can be used for malting purposes after the harvest due to poor
quality. There exists some portion of barley produced in Canada that is marginal in
malting quality. This marginal barley could be sold as malting barley in years when the
average quality of the barley crop around the world is poor, because importers reduce
their quality specifications  on malting barley under these situations. This decision is
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made through the dynamic interaction of selectors, importers, and the CWB. Hence, on
the margin, feed barley can be substituted for malting barley and the CWB has direct
influence over the selection rate. That is, within a certain range, the CWB influences the
percentage of the total amount of Canadian barley actually sold as malting barley, based
upon both domestic and global market demand for malting barley.
A Model of CWB Strategic Behavior
In order to compare Canadian barley producer revenue under the CWB with the revenue
that would be generated by multiple sellers, a synthetic model designed to approximate
the behavior of the CWB must be specified.  Once the synthetic model is specified, esti-
mates of the demand parameters associated with the synthetic model must be generated
and then inserted into a second, counterfactual model that simulates a multiple-seller
environment.
The following model of CWB behavior incorporates price discrimination across inter-
national markets for barley of similar types.2 It also specifies behavioral relationships
that determine the amount of Canadian six-rowed barley actually sold for malting
purposes versus the quantity of six-rowed barley sold as feed. In addition, the model
incorporates behavioral relationships that determine the amount of Canadian two-
rowed barley actually sold for malting purposes versus the amount of two-rowed barley
sold as feed.
The objective of the CWB  is to allocate the total quantity of barley it receives  from
producers in a given crop year across international feed barley markets, domestic and
international two-rowed malting barley markets, and domestic and international six-
rowed malting barley markets, in order to maximize the return to pool (RTP). Mathe-
matically, this objective  can be written as follows:
(1)  Max RTP(QF, Qs, QT)
L  M  N
Pi(QF  )QF  + E  P(Qj Q  + sPkQ  ) Q
i=l  j=l  k=l
with respect to  QF = {QF, ..., Q}, Qs = {Qs, ... , Q  }, and QT = {QT,  ...  Q}.  From this
objective, PF(QF)  and QF represent the inverse excess demand function for Canadian feed
barley and the quantity of Canadian feed barley sold in international market i, respec-
tively; Ps(Qs) and Qs represent the inverse demand function and the quantity of six-
rowed malting barley sold into the domestic market; Ps(Q)  and QJ (Vj ￿  1) represent
the inverse excess demand function for Canadian six-rowed malting barley and the
quantity of Canadian six-rowed malting barley sold in international marketj; P 1(QT)
and Q1 represent the inverse demand function and the quantity of two-rowed malting
barley sold into the domestic market; and finally, PT(QT) and QT (V  k  ￿  1) represent the
inverse excess demand function for Canadian two-rowed malting barley and the quantity
of Canadian two-rowed malting barley sold in international market k.
2 Refer to Brooks and Schmitz  for a series of tests providing evidence of price discrimination by the CWB  across inter-
national feed barley markets.
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Notice that the inverse demand for feed in the Canadian domestic market (PD(QD))
is not part of the pool account, and is therefore not considered in the objective function
of the CWB. However, the behavior of producers regarding the allocation of sales of feed
barley to the CWB versus sales to the domestic market must be incorporated into the
model.
Given the total amount of barley produced in a given year, Canadian barley producers
have several options. If their barley is of high enough quality to be sold as six-rowed or
two-rowed  malting barley,  they must deliver  it to the CWB  in order to capture any
malting premiums they might receive. If they sell feed barley, they have the option to
deliver to the domestic feed market or to the CWB for export. If the expected world price
is high relative to current domestic prices, the producer delivers to the pool.  If the
expected world price is low, the producer delivers to the domestic feed market. There-
fore, the price the producer eventually receives for feed barley can be approximated by
the weighted average price received by the CWB for all feed barley exports in a given
year.3 Mathematically,  this condition can be expressed as:
L
EiiPF  QF
(2)  PD(QD) =  i =
EQF
i=l
where PD(QD) is the Canadian feed barley market price, and QD is domestic feed con-
sumption. The term on the right-hand side approximates the pooled price for feed barley,
which equals the weighted average price received by the CWB from all international
feed barley markets. The solution to objective (1) subject to equation (2) determines the
sales behavior of the CWB. The optimality conditions can be solved simultaneously using
the method of Lagrangian multipliers. Formally, the Lagrangian is written as:
(3)  L  = RTP(QF, Qs, QT)
L  M  N
+  QB  - p _  Q  (PT  E  Q  )  QD PD)  ,
i=l  j=1  k=1
where RTP(QF, QS,  QT) is the return to pool  as defined by (1);  X is the shadow value
which measures the additional revenue that would accrue to Canadian barley producers
if they were to sell one more bushel of barley at the margin; QB is the total quantity of
barley available to be delivered  to both the domestic market and the CWB in a given
year; and Qx(P  ) represents the demand function for any good x in any market y.
We proceed by assuming the inverse demand can be approximated by the following
linear functions:
Y  Y  Y  Y  Y (4)  Px(QI)  = ax-  P xQ  V goods x into market y.
3 Fortunately or unfortunately,  as the case may be, the CWB was not in the business of predicting its final yearly pooled
price until measures such as the "Expected Pool Return" and "Pool Return Outlook" were released to its producers starting
in  1993. Consequently, there  is no way to determine exactly what producers expected to receive prior to 1993.  Hence, the
pooled price is used as an approximation.
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Under the above assumptions, the first-order conditions can be derived from relation-
ships (2)-(4) by taking the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to each quantity
(QX ). This process yields the following set of first-order conditions:
i(XF  ,  ti  QF
(5.1)  X--  - vi  =1  . ..,L,
1  P(Q)  - +  (4  F, Qi)
L
PD  QF
.:'·~  ~  i=l
(5.2)  X =  o(4,  p.,  Q)  Vj =1, ... ,M,
and
(5.3)  k  k  k (5.3)  X =  (TX(4, pT, QT)  Vk = 1,...,N,
where  jx;(ax, Px, QX)  =  - - 2pjQX, which can be interpreted as the "standard" marginal
revenue condition for a profit-maximizing monopolist with respect to good x into market
y. If the bottom expression in equation (5.1) were equal to one, implying that the domestic
price  is equal to the standard marginal revenue condition for a price-discriminating
monopolist, the CWB objective would be the same for feed markets as for malting barley
markets. In general, however, this is not the case because the CWB does not maximize
revenue with respect to sales into the domestic feed barley market.
Equations  (2), (5.1), (5.2), and (5.3) can be rewritten in terms of the price elasticities
of demand for different types of Canadian barley in different markets using the following
relationship:
Y  aQXY  PxY  PxY
(6)  E X -
aPx Qx  P QX
In addition, the intercept parameter  ax for barley of type x sold into markety can be
recovered from the price (P  ) and the demand elasticity  (ex) through the relationship:
(7)  = P(1 - 1/ex).
Inserting relationships  (6) and (7) into equations (2), (5.1), (5.2), and (5.3) yields the
following system of equations in terms of prices, quantities, and demand elasticities:
L
PF'QF
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(8.3)  = Pd(1 + 1/e)  Vj = 1,...,M,
and
(8.4)  X = PT(1 + 1/eT)  V k = 1, ... ,N.
The purpose of formulating the system of equations represented by (8.1)-(8.4) is to
approximate  the demand parameters  associated with Canadian feed, six-rowed,  and
two-rowed malting barley by taking into account the behavior of the CWB and the
behavior of Canadian producers who deliver to the CWB. For the purposes of this study,
a complete data set containing prices and quantities sold into each market by the CWB
is available.  Given these prices and quanities, the solution to the above system of equa-
tions approximates the demand elasticities associated with each type of barley into each
market. However, even when prices and quantities are known, the above system contains
(L +  M +  N  +  1) equations, but actually has (L +  M +  N  +  3) unknowns. Once the elasticities
into two different markets are provided exogenously, the solution to (8.1)-(8.4) will gen-
erate the unknown demand elasticities associated with all other markets.
A Model of Strategic Behavior by Multiple Sellers
To measure the impact of multiple sellers on the allocation of Canadian barley across
markets and the prices realized by multiple sellers, a counterfactual simulation model
must be developed that approximates the behavior of Canadian producers in the absence
of the CWB. In equilibrium, the law of one price would have to hold for all domestic and
international sales of Canadian barley of the same type under pure competition. Under
a multiple-seller regime, the price of Canadian feed barley sold to all markets would be
equal, the price of six-rowed malting barley sold to all markets would be equal, and the
price of two-rowed malting barley sold to all markets would be equal as long as they are
valued at a common domestic location. The price of  malting barley could never drop below
the price of feed barley or it would simply be marketed as feed. Moreover,  the price of
malting barley would remain at a premium to feed barley in order for producers to seed
these varieties given the additional management and costs required to grow malting
barley and the lower yield of malting barley varieties relative to feed barley varieties
in some areas of western Canada.
Using the excess demand elasticities in each of the barley markets as derived in the
previous section, one can approximate the prices and quantities that would have resulted
under multiple sellers in each year. The objectives underlying the behavior of multiple
sellers in pure competition are as follows:
L  M
(9)  Max TR(QD,  QF  QS, QT)  =  PF(QF)Q  +  Ps(s)Q
i=1  j=l
N
+  PT(QT)QT  +  PD(QD)QD
k=1
with respect to QF={Q  ...,Q  },  =  {QS  ...  QS }  {Q=  ..,Q  }, andQD, and subject
to:
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L  M  N
(9.1)  QB  =  Q(P)  T  Qs(PsT)  +  +  QT  )  Q(D),
i=1  j=1  k=l
(9.2)  [PF(QF) - PD(QD)](Q)  = 0  i  {1,  ... , L},
(9.3)  [Ps(Qs) -PsQl)(Qs)  )  = 0  Vje {2,....M},
(9.4)  [prk(&k)_PpIQ  _pQl  Q (9.4)  [PT(Q)  -P  )](Q)  = 0  V k e {2,....,N},
(9.5)  Ps(Q)  = PD(QD)  + As  Ve  {  1,..., M},
and
(9.6)  P(QT) =PD(QD)  +AT  V k{1,...,N},
where As and AT are exogenous parameters that capture the average cost difference
between  growing feed barley  and growing  six-rowed  and two-rowed  malting barley,
respectively.  Unlike the objectives of the CWB in (1), the objectives of multiple sellers
in (9) involve the allocation of Canadian barley across all markets, including the domestic
feed market.  Under the above system of equations, the introduction of multiple sellers
has the possibility to result in either a lower or a higher price in the domestic feed
market. The equilibrium prices and quantities that would have been allocated  by
multiple sellers across markets in a given year can be estimated by solving the system
represented by (9) simultaneously, given the quantity of all barley available, estimates
of As and AT,  and the demand elasticities generated by the synthetic  CWB model.
Estimates of Demand Elasticities (1985-94)
For purposes of this study, the CWB provided detailed contract data on its daily sales
of feed barley, six-rowed malting barley, and two-rowed malting barley sales by destina-
tion from 1985/86 through 1994/95. All prices are in Canadian dollars and were brought
to a common f.o.b. basis point (Vancouver or Thunder Bay).
Daily sales made by the CWB were aggregated into nine distinct markets categorized
as follows: (a) the Japanese feed market, (b) the U.S. feed market, (c) all other offshore
feed barley markets (ROW), (d) the Canadian six-rowed malting market, (e) the U.S. six-
rowed malting market, (f)  offshore six-rowed malting markets (ROW), (g) the Canadian
two-rowed malting market, (h) the U.S. two-rowed malting market, and (i) offshore two-
rowed malting markets  (ROW).  Data for the Canadian domestic  two-rowed and  six-
rowed malting barley markets are comprised of only domestically consumed barley. The
malting barley domestically processed into malt and/or beer and subsequently exported
is not included as sales to these respective  markets.4
The data for each of the markets were further aggregated on a yearly basis using the
crop year from August 1 through July 31. 5 The yearly quantity sold into a particular
4 These data were obtained under a strict confidential agreement  between the authors and the Canadian Wheat Board.
As such, they can be disseminated in aggregate form only.
5 This approximates the pool return, but does not match it perfectly because  of differences in the timing of sales and
deliveries.
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Table 1.  Barley Markets Under the Canadian Wheat Board in  1991/92
F.O.B.  Quantity  Market
Price  Sold  Revenue  Demand
Market  ($/mt)  (000s mt)  ($ mil.)  Elasticity
Feed Markets:
Japan  135.74  1,015  138  -3.69
United States  106.73  143  15  -13.80
Rest of World (ROW)  104.21  1,336  139  -20.00
Canada Domestic  117.18  7,229  847  -0.53
6-Rowed Malting Markets:
Canada Domestic  163.09  91  15  -1.96
United States  125.81  288  36  -2.74
Rest of World (ROW)  127.39  83  11  -2.68
2-Rowed Malting Markets:
Canada Domestic  167.78  137  23  -1.91
United States  147.01  111  16  -2.19
Rest of World (ROW)  138.93  804  112  -2.36
Totals:
Feed Exports  117.18  2,494  292  -13.01
All Feed  117.18  9,723  1,139  -3.73
6-Rowed Malting  133.46  463  62  -2.58
2-Rowed Malting  143.52  1,051  151  -2.28
All Barley  120.32  11,238  1,352  -3.55
Sources:  Elasticities calculated by the authors; all other data provided by the CWB.
Note:  All prices are given in Canadian dollars  per metric tonne.
market was computed as the simple sum of all sales into that market for the crop year.
The yearly average price received from each market was computed as the weighted
average  of all sales into that market over the crop year. The total quantity of barley
available for sale in western Canada in a given crop year was estimated as the total
volume of actual CWB barley sales in that year, plus domestic feed barley consumption
reported by Statistics Canada.
To obtain estimates using the solution to system (8.1)-(8.4),  it is assumed that the
elasticity of domestic feed barley demand in Canada in each year is - 0.53, as estimated
by Schmitz and Koo.  The elasticity of excess demand for Canadian feed barley in the
ROW is assumed to be -20  in every year. This value is reasonable given the CWB does
not have a large effect on the price in that market because of export subsidies by the
United States and European Union, and the large quantities of feed barley sold by its
competitors.
The system is solved individually for each of the 10 crop years from 1985-94, yielding
a different set of demand elasticities for each year. In the interest of brevity, the full set
of resulting elasticities for each of the 10 years is not reproduced here.6 However, the
results for the 1991/92 crop year are provided in table 1.  The 10 markets available to
6 The full set of resulting elasticities  is available  from the authors upon request.
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Canadian barley producers are listed in the first column of table 1. The CWB made sales
into all of the markets shown with the exception of the Canadian domestic feed markets.
The weighted average f.o.b. prices actually received by the CWB in each market are
shown in column 2. The average prices received for feed barley, six-rowed malting barley,
and two-rowed malting under the CWB in 1991/92 were $117.18/mt,  $133.46/mt, and
$143.52/mt, respectively.  These prices reflect the average price received at a common
basis point. Hence, they are not comparable to prices contained in CWB annual reports
or in other published series that provide average spot prices at other locations.
The actual quantities  sold by the CWB  into each market in  1991/92  are shown in
table  1,  column 3, and the revenue  accrued by the CWB is reported in column 4. The
demand elasticities generated by the synthetic model are provided in column 5. Notice
that the elasticity of excess demand for Canadian feed barley in the United States was
-13.8 in 1991/92. Also, the elasticity of excess demand for Canadian feed barley in Japan
was -3.69.  These results  are well within the expected range.  The elasticities for the
malting barley markets are also shown. Note that they range between -1.91 and -2.74.
These elasticities seem plausible given the fact that they are elasticities for excess
demand functions in individual markets for Canadian malting barley only.
Estimates of Prices and Trade Flows
Under Multiple Sellers  (1985-94)
The simultaneous solution to (9) determines the trade flows and prices resulting from
the introduction of multiple sellers of Canadian barley. For empirical purposes, the cost
differences  (As and AT) between feed and malting barley prices required for equations
(9.5) and (9.6) are set at $15/mt in most years.  However, in some years, the overall
quality of the Canadian barley crop was so low that not much additional malting quality
barley was available. In those years the constraints (9.5) and/or (9.6) were replaced
with:
~M~+




(9.6a)  Q  k)  = QCWB +
k=l
where QwB  and QcwB denote the amount of six-rowed malting and two-rowed malting
barley, respectively, actually sold by the CWB in that year, and  5s and 
5 T represent the
additional quantity of six-rowed or two-rowed barley of marginal quality available for
sale beyond the amount that was actually sold by the CWB.
The total quantity of Canadian six-rowed and two-rowed malting barley available in
each year was estimated by the United Grain Growers (UGG) in its Harvest Quality
Survey. These estimates were calculated  as percentages of the entire Canadian barley
crop. They were used as constraints in the model so that there were different values for
6s and 6b for each year. The  maximum amount of two-rowed  malting barley deemed
selectable by the UGG in 1986/87 (5.5% of total barley production) was the only case in
which constraints (9.5a) and/or (9.6a) were binding. Further, when comparing UGG
estimates to actual CWB contract data, the selectable two-rowed estimates by the UGG
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Table 2.  Barley Markets Under Multiple Sellers  in  1991/92
F.O.B.  Quantity  Market
Price  Sold  Revenue  Demand
Market  ($/mt)  (000s mt)  ($ mil.)  Elasticity
Feed Markets:
Japan  109.29  1,746  191  -1.73
United States  109.29  96  10  -21.12
Rest of World (ROW)  109.29  32  4  -866.54
Canada Domestic  109.29  7,487  818  -0.48
6-Rowed  Malting Markets:
Canada Domestic  124.29  134  17  -1.02
United States  124.29  298  37  -2.62
Rest of World (ROW)  124.29  89  11  -2.46
2-Rowed  Malting Markets:
Canada Domestic  124.29  204  25  -0.95
United States  124.29  148  18  -1.38
Rest of World (ROW)  124.29  1,004  125  -1.69
Totals:
Feed Exports  109.29  1,874  205  -17.65
All Feed  109.29  9,361  1,023  -3.91
6-Rowed Malting  124.29  520  65  -2.18
2-Rowed Malting  124.29  1,356  169  -1.54
All Barley  111.79  11,238  1,256  -3.55
Source:  Calculated by the authors.
Notes:  All prices are given in Canadian dollars per metric tonne. Table calculations make the following
three assumptions:
(1) the elasticity of demand for Canadian feed barley in the ROW is -20,
(2)  the Canadian  domestic feed demand elasticity is -0.53,  and
(3)  the malting barley price remains at a $15/mt premium to feed barley.
were lower than what the CWB actually sold in 1987/88 and 1991/92. Hence, the amount
of  two-rowed malting barley available for sale by multiple sellers was constrained by the
actual amount that was sold by the CWB in these two years. 7
The results of the counterfactual multiple-seller solution (9) in the 1991/92 crop year
are provided in table 2. This table has the same format as table  1,  but provides the
multiple-seller solution. Under multiple sellers, the equilibrium market price for all
sales of Canadian feed barley would have been $109.29/mt, and the price received for
sales  of both six-rowed  and two-rowed  Canadian  malting barley would have been
$124.29/mt. Point elasticities for Canadian malting barley under the counterfactual
simulation are also provided for the interested reader.8
7 For more detailed  data and a thorough discussion of the quantity of marginal malting barley available under multiple
sellers compared  to that with the CWB,  see Schmitz, Gray, Schmitz, and Storey.
8Note that if table 1 is compared to table 2, multiple sellers would have exported more six-rowed and two-rowed malting
barley to the United States in 1991/92. These results are consistent with those of Johnson and Wilson, and Wilson and
Johnson.
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Table 3.  Impacts of Replacing the Canadian Wheat Board with Multiple
Sellers of Canadian Barley (1985/86-1994/95)
6-Rowed  2-Rowed  Total
Feed  Malting  Malting  Producer
Barley Price  Barley Price  Barley Price  Revenue a
Crop Year  ($/mt)  ($/mt)  ($/mt)  ($ mil.)
1985/86  -4.91  -95.70  -80.93  -104
1986/87b  -4.46  -63.16  -30.08  -96
1987/88 C  -11.36  -84.08  -13.18  -156
1988/89  1.10  -72.63  -59.20  -35
1989/90  0.86  -37.18  -47.90  -19
1990/91  -7.89  -28.28  -2.50  -102
1991/92  -7.90  -9.17  -19.23  -96
1992/93  -4.68  -12.50  -36.05  -66
1993/94  -2.62  1.23  -16.05  -48
1994/95  6.62  -18.66  -35.51  7
Average:  -3.52  -42.01  -34.06  -72
Source:  Calculated by the authors.
Notes:  All prices are given in Canadian dollars per metric tonne. Table calculations make the following three
assumptions:
(1) the elasticity of demand for Canadian feed barley in the ROW is -20,
(2) the Canadian  domestic feed demand elasticity is -0.53,  and
(3) the malting barley price remains at a $15/mt premium to feed barley,  except as denoted below.
aTotal producer revenue includes the impact on the domestic feed barley market.
bThe quantity of 2-rowed barley sold as malting barley under multiple sellers is constrained by the UGG estimate.
cThe quantity of 2-rowed barley sold as malting barley under multiple sellers is constrained by the CWB level.
Impacts of Replacing the CWB with
Multiple Sellers
The impacts on prices and revenue from replacing the CWB with multiple sellers of feed
barley, six-rowed  malting barley, and two-rowed  malting barley in each year from
1985/86 through 1994/95 are reported in table 3. For example, the 1991/92 price differ-
ence  represents a $9.17/mt decline for six-rowed malting barley under multiple sellers.
This number is equal to the difference between the weighted average price of six-rowed
malting barley sold under the CWB (from table 1) and the weighted average price of six-
rowed malting barley that would have been sold under multiple sellers (from table 2).
The CWB captured  higher prices than multiple sellers on sales of six-rowed malting
barley in all years except 1993/94. In that year, multiple sellers could have achieved  a
small price increase of $1.23/mt on sales of six-rowed malting barley. The annual average
price increase  earned  by the  CWB for six-rowed  malting barley relative  to multiple
sellers, over the 10-year period from 1985/86 through 1994/95, was $42.01/mt.
Consider two-rowed malting barley market prices (column 4 of table 3). The calculated
annual average price difference between the CWB and the multiple-seller structure on
sales of two-rowed malting barley for the 1985/86-1994/95  period is $34.06/mt.  The
premiums range from $2.50/mt in 1990/91 to $80.93/mt in 1985/86. Based on our results,
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Table 4. Change in Trade Flows Under Multiple Sellers of Canadian  Barley
(1985/86-1994/95)
Domestic  Export  6-Rowed  2-Rowed
Feed Barley  Feed Barley  Malting Barley  Malting Barley
Consumption  Sales  Sales  Sales
Crop Year  (000s mt)  (000s mt)  (000s mt)  (000s mt)
1985/86  175  -634  266  193
1986/87  225  -575  216  134
1987/88b  524  -753  229  0
1988/89  -30  -506  169  367
1989/90  -23  -391  100  314
1990/91b  294  -527  233  0
1991/92  258  -620  58  305
1992/93  134  -556  76  347
1993/94  96  -323  -16  242
1994/95  -220  -258  58  419
Average:  143  -514  139  232
Source:  Calculated by the authors.
Note:  Table calculations make the following three assumptions:
(1) the elasticity of demand for Canadian feed barley in the ROW is -20,
(2)  the Canadian domestic feed demand elasticity is -0.53, and
(3) the malting barley price remains at a $15/mt premium to feed barley, except as denoted below.
aThe quantity of 2-rowed barley sold as malting barley under multiple sellers is constrained by the UGG estimate.
bThe quantity of 2-rowed barley sold as malting barley under multiple sellers is constrained by the CWB level.
the CWB captured higher prices for two-rowed malting barley than multiple sellers
would have received in every year considered here.
Multiple sellers of Canadian feed barley would have experienced a reduction  of
$3.52/mt in the average price received in all feed barley markets (including the domestic
market) from 1985/86-1994/95.  Premiums on feed barley earned by the CWB  over
multiple sellers range from -$6.62/mt to +$11.36/mt (table 3). The CWB is estimated to
have increased  the prices received  by Canadian  feed barley producers in 1985/86,
1986/87, and 1990/91-1993/94. Conversely, multiple sellers would have earned a higher
average price for Canadian feed barley on sales into feed markets in 1988/89, 1989/90,
and 1994/95 ($1.10/mt,  $0.86/mt, and $6.62/mt, respectively).
The impact on average producer revenue from replacing the CWB with multiple sellers
of all Canadian barley is given in column 5 of table 3. Over the 1985/86-1994/95 period,
the introduction of multiple sellers would have resulted in an annual average loss of $72
million on aggregate sales to feed and malting barley markets. Five additional scenarios
were estimated in order to perform a sensitivity analysis: the elasticity of demand for
Canadian feed barley in the rest of the world was changed from -20 to -5;  the elasticity
of the domestic demand for Canadian feed barley was changed from -0.53 to -0.20,  and
then changed again to - 1.00; and the malting barley price premium relative to feed
barley under multiple sellers was changed from $15/mt to $10/mt, and then changed
again to $20/mt. The estimated annual average gain attributed to the CWB relative to
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multiple sellers in feed and malting barley markets ranged from $50 million to $75
million depending upon the different parameters.9
The estimates of barley trade flows under multiple sellers are provided in table 4. In
most years, if available, multiple sellers would have reallocated into malting barley
markets some marginal quality barley that the CWB sold as feed, because they could
receive a higher price for it. On average, over the 1985/86-1994/95 period, multiple
sellers would have exported 514,000 mt less feed barley than under the CWB. They would
have increased the average amount of six-rowed malting barley sold by 139,000 mt, and
increased the average amount of two-rowed malting barley by 232,000 mt.
Limitations of the Analysis
The results of the analysis are based on price discrimination  by the Canadian Wheat
Board across barley markets of a similar type and reflect the power of the CWB to
influence the selection  rate associated with six-rowed  and two-rowed malting barley.
The availability of actual CWB barley sales contract data allowed this study to go beyond
previous studies for which such detailed data were not available. The effort to capture
the relationship among feed and malting barley markets subject to the acquisition con-
straint in the domestic market represents a significant improvement over previous models
that attempt to measure market power exerted by the CWB. Even so, the following
limitations should be kept in mind:
*  The analysis does not include the benefits that Canadian producers have received
when sales returns, less costs of marketing, were below the initial payment made
by the CWB. Over the 1985-94 study period, there were three deficits in the feed
barley pool account that amounted to additional revenue of $264 million from gov-
ernment payments to western Canadian feed barley producers. In the designated
barley pool account there was one deficit in 1986 that accounted for just under $18
million in government payments.
*  The aggregation of sales data into only 10 market segments biases our estimates
of the benefits from market power exerted by the CWB downward.
*  Supply responses under alternative market structures were not integrated into this
analysis.  However, if we had allowed a supply response by Canadian producers,
total production would have decreased under multiple sellers in most years. The
decrease in production would have lowered the amount of barley available for sale
by multiple sellers, which would have decreased export revenue even further.
*  The differences in prices observed across all markets, except in the domestic feed
market, represent a CWB revenue-maximizing strategy. It is assumed that the
CWB has knowledge of how competitor prices will respond to additional quantities
offered for sale in each market and that the CWB uses this information in its sales
decisions.
9  In the interest of brevity, the five appendices showing results of the sensitivity analysis are not included. However, these
tables are available  from the authors upon request.
610  December  2000Market Power and  the Canadian  Wheat Board  611
*  Multiple sellers are assumed to behave in a purely competitive fashion. However,
if the removal of the CWB resulted in a small number of large firms, these firms
could potentially behave as oligopolists with respect to Canadian barley. If this were
to occur, the premium attributed to the CWB in this study is biased upward.  On
the other hand, if multiple sellers could behave as oligopsonists with respect to
domestic producers, then the premium attributed to the CWB in this study is biased
downward.
*  The inverse demand functions are approximated as linear over the range of actual
and simulated competitive prices and quantities.  If the actual demand functions
were nonlinear, there would be small changes (either positive or negative) in the
calculated  differences between the model results and the actual outcomes.
*  The timing of sales throughout the year is assumed to be the same as that which
would have occurred in a multiple-seller environment.  Neither the gains nor the
losses that could have accrued under different timing of sales were captured in the
analysis. 10
*  The empirical analysis does not account for the potential interest lost by those
producers who receive initial payment from the CWB and then are forced to wait
up to 18 months to receive the final payment. The advent of multiple sellers would
allow all producers to receive immediate full payment, similar to those producers
who currently sell off-board feed barley. Our estimates of the benefits of market
power exerted by the CWB are biased upward due to the exclusion of this loss of
potential interest.
Policy  Implications
Our analysis demonstrates  the increase in revenue  that can be generated by the
Canadian Wheat Board through international price discrimination and market power,
relative to multiple sellers of Canadian barley in competition.  Some feel that because
state trading enterprises  (STEs)  such as the CWB  can exercise market power in
international  markets due to the authority granted them by their governments,  their
activities should be curtailed or eliminated under WTO rules. However, at least in the
case of international grain markets, state trading seems to be more the rule than the
exception. Other STEs that deal in grain (under any definition of state trading) are the
Australian Wheat  Board, the Japanese  Food Agency,  BULOG of Indonesia,  and the
China National Cereals, Oils, and Foodstuffs Import and Export Corporation (COFCO).
In addition,  Ackerman and Dixit  classify the activities  of the  Commodity  Credit
Corporation (CCC) of the United States as a type-II STE prior to policy reform in 1996,
and a type-I STE after policy reform. Moreover, using their classification scheme, the
European Union Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) would seem to fit under the type-II
classification.
10For a detailed discussion of the potential arbitrage losses attributed to differences in timing associated with pooled pricing
schemes, see Schmitz, Gray, Schmitz, and Storey.
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State trading will be a major topic of discussion during upcoming WTO negotiations
pertaining to agriculture, especially with the potential of China's ascension.11 As dis-
cussed by Baban, STEs must meet three criteria to avoid violating WTO rules: (a) price
discrimination  can be used, but only for commercial reasons  and not for political
reasons;  (b) the use of quantitative restrictions is to be limited; and (c) the WTO must
be notified of all state trading activities by each member country. A major problem
arises because of the ambiguities inherent in the definitions of these three criteria-it
can be simultaneously argued that the CWB satisfies all three criteria, or that the CWB
satisfies none of these criteria, depending upon which position one wishes to take.
The first criterion for WTO compliance is that a country must not price discriminate
for political reasons. Brooks and Schmitz provide statistical evidence that the CWB does
price discriminate among countries. However, many attribute this to hard price discrim-
ination, a view consistent with the analysis performed in this study. That is, the CWB
price  discriminates in order to maximize revenue  by withholding barley in relatively
inelastic markets and redistributing sales to relatively elastic markets. This form  of
discrimination is certainly driven by commercial reasons, which does not violate WTO
rules. On the other hand, during most of the period of this analysis, the U.S.  also
practiced price discrimination through the Export Enhancement Program (EEP). The
U.S. used taxpayers' dollars to subsidize  exports during the EEP period. However, on
rare occasions, the CWB also used government subsidies to pay the deficit in the pool
account caused by high initial payments.
The second criterion for WTO compliance is that the use of quantitative restrictions
must be limited. While the CWB does not limit the volume of barley grown by producers,
by practicing hard price discrimination, it is essentially restricting quantities into
certain countries. If this violates the second criterion, then it also contradicts the first.
Prior to 1996, the U.S. restricted domestic quantities through its Acreage Reduction
Program. Even as of the year 2000, the Conservation Reserve Program might be viewed
as restricting quantities as well.
The final criterion is that member countries must notify the WTO of state trading
activities. Historically, the WTO has been notified of state trading activities by the
CWB. However, there is some debate as to how much information should be contained
in such notification. Some suggest that the CWB must become completely transparent,
implying that it should report not only the volume of exports to each country but also
the individual prices received. Others argue that private grain companies do not report
their prices, so why should the CWB? Indeed, U.S. grain companies do not report their
prices except when they receive EEP bonuses.
Perhaps the criterion for measuring state trading activities  should be revised  and
viewed in the context of an STE's ability to distort trade. Through welfare analysis and
trade theory, models have been  developed to measure the degree of trade distortion
caused by government policies. For example, Alston and Gray performed an analysis of
trade distortions caused by state trading versus export subsidies. They compared Cana-
dian policies to U.S. policies in the case of wheat and found: "Relative to the marketing
board, the transfer efficiency of export subsidies can be higher or lower, in terms of
benefits  to producers per dollar of harm to domestic consumers  and taxpayers, but it
n For further details regarding state trading and the World Trade Organization, see Schmitz, Furtan, and Baylis, and also
Schmitz and Schmitz.
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cannot be lower in terms of benefits to producers per dollar of harm to third countries"
(p. 65). Unfortunately, this type of analysis must be performed on a case-by-case basis
because  one model  does not fit all situations.  Moreover, the process of obtaining
empirical results is inherently  complicated by the lack of data available  for most
countries.
Conclusions
This  study addresses  the issue of market power  exerted by a state trading exporter
using the  Canadian Wheat Board  and international  barley markets as an example.
First,  a synthetic model was derived to estimate the import demand parameters  for
Canadian feed, two-rowed,  and six-rowed malting barley by country of destination
in each year from  1985-94. These parameters  were estimated as an entire system
using a set of equations to capture the price-discriminating  behavior  of the  CWB
across markets for similar types of barley, the interaction between feed and malting
barley markets at the margin, and the behavior of Canadian producers with respect
to the CWB.
Second, these parameters were inserted into a counterfactual model which simulated
the revenue that would accrue to Canadian barley producers if the CWB were replaced
by purely competitive  multiple sellers.  The actual revenue realized by Canadian feed
and malting barley producers from 1985-94 was compared to the revenue that would
have accrued to producers if the CWB had not exercised control over feed and malting
barley exports over the same period.
Based on the results of our analysis, the CWB was able to obtain higher prices for
Canadian two-rowed malting barley producers in every year from 1985/86 through
1994/95. It  obtained higher prices for Canadian six-rowed malting barley producers in
every year except 1993/94, and higher prices for Canadian feed barley producers in every
year except 1988/89,  1989/90, and 1994/95. From 1985/86 through 1994/95, the CWB
was able to generate an average of $72 million more in annual revenue than what purely
competitive multiple sellers would have generated on all barley sales in aggregate. Only
in 1994/95 would a multiple-seller market structure have been able to perform better
than the CWB on aggregate sales of Canadian barley, generating an increase of $7
million in total barley revenue in that year.
The increase in average revenue accruing to Canadian barley producers attributed
to the CWB is larger than estimates from previous studies. Four major reasons explain
this result: (a) the price wedges from actual CWB sales contract data are larger than
those assumed in previous studies, (b) our model examines the impact of a full dual
market rather than the more restrictive case of a continental barley market, (c) we
include the intertwining relationships between feed and malting barley markets in
our analysis, and (d) we include the impact on the domestic feed market in our calcu-
lations.
[Received December 1999; final revision received  July 2000.]
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